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Introduction
"[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case has become an absolute plague."1
Nearly ten years after he first made it, Senior Judge Nichols'
statement still holds true.2 Once a patent case reaches the litigation
stage, the stakes involved appear to outweigh any deterrents to false
defenses raised in the pleadings. Given today's attitude toward
zealously advocating the client's cause, even the slimmest evidence
compels an attorney to plead inequitable conduct as a defense.
Counsel then hopes to turn something up during the fishing expedition
that we now call discovery. If the charge appears groundless, the
defense risks Rule 11 sanctions,3 which most judges impose only in
extreme cases.4 While no one wants to incur the wrath of the court or
the penalties involved in sanctions, if the choice is between a
preliminary injunction that stops a company in its tracks, or a
groundless inequitable conduct defense, the stakes make the choice
relatively easy. In the meantime, both sides and the court spend
valuable resources on the inequitable conduct issue, and defendants
may be able to convince plaintiffs to settle a perfectly valid
infringement claim for cents on the dollar. Ultimately this results in
wasteful use of scarce judicial resources, economically inefficient
outcomes, and cumbersome burdens for anyone involved in the patent
application process.
This note concentrates exclusively on inequitable conduct during
prosecution of a patent application before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO").5 Initially, this note provides a
1. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(Nichols, J.).
2. See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545,
1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[T]he rule of Kingsdown evolved in response to the 'plague' of
collateral attacks, of which this is an example, wherein routine patent practice is challenged
without substance."). Id.
3. Rule 11 requires a party to verify that all representations filed in court are correct.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
4. Sanctions are generally imposed in "exceptional cases" which courts are reluctant
to find. See, e.g., Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 678 F. Supp.
809, 812 (1987) (refusing to award legal fees to either side in an inequitable conduct case).
See also Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (district court found inequitable conduct in patent prosecution but declined to award
either party attorneys' fees or sanctions).
5. Discussion of other forms of inequitable conduct such as inequitable enforcement
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definition of inequitable conduct before the PTO.6 Next, this note
describes some of the legal consequences of inequitable conduct,
including unenforceability of the patent and possible liability for
patent misuse and securities violations. This note also details the
method available for curing inequitable conduct before prosecution of
the patent application ends. This note then addresses problems with
the current state of the law, such as lack of clear standards, ease of
raising the defense, collateral effects of unenforceability on licenses,
and unavailability of a post-issue cure. Finally, I propose possible
solutions to these problems, including penalizing the party that loses
on the inequitable conduct issue in litigation and allowing post-issue
cure of inequitable conduct through reexamination or reissue.
I
Inequitable Conduct Defined 7
In brief, inequitable conduct can be defined as knowingly
breaching the standards for doing business with the PTO as set forth
in the rules promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks.' Congress does not mention inequitable conduct
explicitly in the statutes governing patents. Nor do the rules
promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
mention inequitable conduct, but they do set forth standards of
conduct for patent attorneys and agents9 prosecuting1 ° patent
of patents, patent misuse, and inequitable conduct of litigation is well beyond the scope of
this note.
6. "Inequitable conduct" refers to conduct before the PTO unless otherwise noted.
7. For more information on the history of the inequitable conduct defense, see
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993). For another useful article in this area, see Patricia N.
Brantley, Ethical Issues in Patent Prosecution and Litigation, CA15 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 227
(1995).
8. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996) purports to set out the standard for doing business with the
PTO.
9. Patent agents are licensed to prosecute patents before the PTO. They must have
passed the Patent Bar Exam, given by the PTO, and must have passed a minimal
determination of moral character. However, patent agents need not have any formal legal
training, nor be members of any state's bar. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.6(b), 10.7 (1996).
10. The actions taken by a person and her representatives in applying to the PTO for
a patent are referred to as prosecution. These actions include supplying information to the
PTO on the invention, supplying information on known prior art related to the invention,
and arguing the merits of the invention over what is already known to those skilled in the
relevant art.
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applications before the PTO.n The courts look to the PTO rules for
guidance, but are ultimately controlled by Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit precedents which stand independent of the PTO rules.' 2
Utilizing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks' rule-
making power,' 3 the PTO promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("Rule 56") to
define the proper way of doing business with the PTO:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest....
Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing
with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patent-
ability .... 14
Rule 56 later defines materiality:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to
information already of record or being made of record in the
application, and (1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with
other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes
in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.15
Rule 56 sets out a "duty of candor and good faith" that must be
observed by anyone involved with the prosecution of a patent
application including the applicant, the patent attorney, and any
corporate officers involved in the application process. 6 The PTO
generally takes the position that Rule 56 is the mechanism that forces
people to cite information to the examiner early in the application
process, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the examination.1 7
Each person associated with a patent application has a duty to inform
the PTO of information relevant to the patent application and to
ensure that misrepresentations are not knowingly made in supplying
or failing to supply the PTO with such information.
11. See37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996).
12. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd., v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 6. (West 1984 & Supp. 1997).
14. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1996).
15. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
16. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Rene D. Tegtmeyer, The Patent and Trademark Office View of
Inequitable Conduct or Attempted Fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, 16 AIPLA
Q.J. 88 (1988).
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Even though this rule binds anyone practicing before the PTO, it
does not control a court's determination of whether inequitable
conduct has occurred."8 While, Rule 56 provides a starting point for
the courts, Supreme Court and Federal Circuit19 precedents ultimately
control the lower courts' decisions. Currently, the Federal Circuit
describes the elements of inequitable conduct as: "[1] failure to
disclose material information, or submission of false material
information, [2] with an intent to deceive" the PTO during
prosecution of a patent application. 21 In addition, intent cannot be
inferred from gross negligence alone, but must come from a
consideration of all circumstances including evidence of good faith.2'
II
Consequences of Inequitable Conduct
A patent obtained through inequitable conduct is
unenforceable.22 Unenforceability is not limited to claims directly
affected by the inequitable conduct; rather it extends to every claim in
the patent.23 Thus, an attorney faced with a patent infringement suit
likely to put his client out of business would understandably feel
compelled to plead inequitable conduct on the slimmest of evidence.
Not only are all of the claims of the tainted application
unenforceable, but inequitable conduct can infect related applications
and patents.24 Inequitable conduct infects the progeny25 of an
18. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
19. The Federal Circuit is the common nickname for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was created in 1982 and has jurisdiction over all
appeals in cases involving claims of patent infringement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1996). The
United States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all claims arising under the
patent laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1996).
20. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 872.
21. See id. at 876.
22. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens v. Lex Tex, 747 F.2d 1553, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Unenforceability is a defense to liability for infringing a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1996).
23. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1567.
24. See Kevin R. Casey, "Infectious Unenforceability:" The Extent or Reach of
Inequitable Conduct on Associated Patents, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 338 (1989) for an excellent
treatment of this subject.
25. Progeny of an application are those applications that were continued under 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.53, 1.60, or 1.62 from the original application, and claim priority under 35
U.S.C. § 120 from the original application.
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application, rendering all of their claims unenforceable unless
properly cured prior to issue.26 Additionally, inequitable conduct in
one patent can affect other patents-in-suits under some
circumstances.27 All things considered, a successful defense of
inequitable conduct can thoroughly destroy a suit for patent
infringement.
If a case of inequitable conduct is egregious enough, the court
could go beyond holding the patent unenforceable and award Rule 11
sanctions against the party asserting the patent for filing a paper (the
pleading) the party did not have grounds to believe was correct.28
However, the general idea of sanctioning anyone significantly seems
to have little appeal to the courts.29 Other possible negative
consequences include liability in antitrust suits for patent misuse.30 In
the Securities law context, corporations can trigger liability by falsely
asserting the validity and value of their patents when reporting
securities information. 31 In some cases, inequitable conduct can even
result in loss of the attorney-client and work product privileges that
normally apply during litigation.32
Even if inequitable conduct charges prove false, both litigants and
the courts must expend tremendous resources on the issue. A charge
of inequitable conduct could prove enough to push a plaintiff toward
settling a legitimate claim at a significantly discounted value. Given
that most patent disputes do not reach trial because the parties prefer
settlement, 33 forcing a plaintiff to settle due to a possibly spurious but
expensive defense to a charge of inequitable conduct seems unfair.
Alleged infringers do risk Rule 11 sanctions for a completely false
charge of inequitable conduct, but this hardly constitutes an
26. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240,245 (1933).
27. See Casey, supra note 24.
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
29. See, e.g., Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (inequitable conduct does not trigger sanctions per se).
30. See DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.03[6][e] (1996).
31. See id., § 19.03[6][g].
32. See id., § 19.03[6][i].
33. In the year ending September 30, 1996, approximately 97% of civil cases filed in
the Federal District Courts were terminated prior to trial, and approximately 86% of all
civil cases in the District Courts were terminated prior to Pretrial. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 165 (Table C-5,
presenting statistics on filing and termination of Civil Cases in the United States District
Courts).
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appropriate risk to balance the drawbacks to patent owners. One can
easily argue that a patent holder trades these risks for the monopoly
conferred by the patent, and that the patent holder has no tougher
burden than any other litigant. However, this ignores the vast
opportunities a defendant in infringement litigation has to argue that
just about any reference can be material enough such that it should
have been cited to the PTO, and that the patent should therefore be
unenforceable. 34
Beyond trial, inequitable conduct could result in discipline of the
involved attorneys or agents by the Office of Enrollment and
Discipline at the PTO.35 Professor Chisum cites Jaskiewicz v.
Mossinghof-f6 for the Federal Circuit's pronouncement that a
violation of the Rule 56 duty of candor and good faith constitutes
grounds for disciplinary action by the PTO.37 However, this
disciplinary action against an attorney or agent would be similar to a
complaint to a state bar, and it would be instituted after a court
investigated the inequitable conduct charges. As such, this would
probably not be a proceeding with respect to a single application; it
would occur long after prosecution of the patent ended.
Finally, a loss by a patent owner on the issue of inequitable
conduct can produce results well beyond the suit at hand. For
instance, a holding of unenforceability by a court precludes suits
against other infringers, because the patent is effectively dead.38
Additionally, licensing agreements involving that patent would likely
require renegotiation in light of an unenforceability holding. In Lear
v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that a holding of invalidity of a
patent makes a license of that patent unenforceable against the
licensee.39 However, many licensing agreements involve multiple
patents, so having only one patent held invalid would merely call into
question what the parties to the agreement now owed each other.
34. See, e.g., Graco Children's Prods. Inc. v. Century Prods. Co., Inc., No. CIV. A 93-
6710, 1996 WL 421966, *32, *40 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (refusing sanctions or costs for a defense
of inequitable conduct even though it included an untimely motion for summary judgment
and no reference or other reliance by the PTO was shown).
35. See CHISUM, supra note 30, § 19.03[6][j].
36. 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
37. See CHISUM, supra note 30, § 19.03[6][j].
38. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1567.
39. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,671-74 (1969).
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Interestingly, Lear can be read to allow a party to refuse paying
any royalties in a licensing agreement accruing from the date of issue
of a patent that is subsequently held invalid.4' Lower courts have
construed Lear such that a licensee of an invalid patent avoids paying
any royalties during the term of that patent.41 However, Lear is
normally construed to allow a licensee to avoid paying royalties only
after the licensee challenges the validity of the patent or a third-party
obtains a judgment holding it invalid.42 On the subject of a typical
complex intellectual property licensing agreement, the court in
Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.43 held that where the
parties had made some accommodations for possible patent invalidity,
the rest of the agreement relating to trade secrets and other species of
intellectual property survived the invalidity of the patent, despite
Lear's apparent suggestion to the contrary.44 The Baladevon court
went so far as to note that the Federal Circuit has narrowed its
application of Lear to cases with similar facts.45 Whether a licensee
could sue a patent owner for fraudulently asserting an unenforceable
patent remains to be seen, but possibilities in the antitrust area
definitely exist.46
III
Curing Inequitable Conduct
Recognizing that not all inequitable conduct defeats patent
enforceability, the Federal Circuit, in the case of Rohm & Haas v.
Crystal Chemical Co., prescribed requirements for curing inequitable
conduct prior to patent issuance.47 There are three steps involved in
curing inequitable conduct:
The first requirement to be met by an applicant, aware of
misrepresentation in the prosecution of his application and desiring
to overcome it, is that he expressly advise the PTO of its existence,
40. Id. at 674.
41. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 456,477-78 (D. Del. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 865 F.2d 896 (7th
Cir. 1989).
43. 871 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994).
44. Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994).
45. Id at 94 (citing RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
46. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
47. Rohm & Haas v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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stating specifically wherein it resides. The second requirement is
that, if the misrepresentation is of one or more facts, the PTO be
advised what the actual facts are, the applicant making it clear that
further examination in light thereof may be required if any PTO
action has been based on the misrepresentation. Finally, on the basis
of the new and factually accurate record, the applicant must
establish patentability of the claimed subject matter.48
Additionally, these steps must be taken by the applicant openly and
on his own initiative.49 One thing the court in Rohm & Haas
emphasized was that supplying the correct facts without calling the
examiner's attention to the prior misrepresentation falls short of
effecting cure.50
The Rohm & Haas case itself included a failed attempt at a
cure.51 During prosecution of the application, Rohm & Haas filed an
affidavit with intentional misrepresentations by omissions.
52
Specifically, it filed an affidavit showing that its herbicide was far
superior to existing herbicides.53 It based this conclusion on test
results compared side-by-side without disclosing that the tests of its
herbicide occurred when plants were at their weakest while the other
herbicides were tested when plants were at their strongest.54
Subsequently, the application was involved in an interference that
lasted several years.55 After resolution of the interference, prosecution
resumed, and attorneys for Rohm & Haas had an interview with the
examiner. 56 At that interview, during a presentation of literally
thousands of pages of documents, counsel for Rohm & Haas apprised
the examiner of the additional facts surrounding the tests originally
misreported in the affidavit, without advising him of the prior
misrepresentation. 57 Rohm & Haas took the position that this
disclosure effectively cured its earlier inequitable conduct because the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1573.
52. Id. at 1563.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1558.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1564-65 and n.5.
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examiner now had the correct facts before him.5" The court noted that
the corrected test data was not presented until the last part of the
interview, and that the examiner testified on the stand both that by
then he "just wanted them to leave[,]" and that in 27 years at the PTO
no one had ever advised him of affidavit misrepresentations.59 The
court found that Rohm & Haas failed to cure its inequitable conduct.60
When applied by courts, the Rohm & Haas standard has proven
flexible. In situations similar to Rohm & Haas where a
misrepresentation in an affidavit occurs, the three step test applies as
well. First, the applicant advises the PTO that the affidavit includes
misrepresentations and specifies what they are. Next, the applicant
supplies whatever is available in the way of correct facts. Finally, the
applicant attempts to prove patentability in light of the true situation.
Other situations of inequitable conduct involve failing to disclose
material references. In these cases, the standard is relaxed since the
examiner merely needs to read the reference.61 The applicant is then
only expected to submit the reference to the examiner in an
information disclosure statement 62 during prosecution.63 However,
this disclosure can lead to sticky situations. Courts have generally
upheld a presumption that government employees do their jobs. 64
Applied to patent prosecution, this means examiners are presumed to
have considered any references they received prior to allowing the
patent.65 As a result, if an examiner finds a reference on his own, he is
presumed to have considered it and thereby relieved the applicant and
his attorney of the duty to bring it to his attention.66
However, if a reference is material enough, simply citing it to the
PTO may not be enough. The problem of "buried references" comes
58. Id. at 1567.
59. Id. at 1569.
60. See id. at 1573.
61. See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d 1967 (N.D. Cal 1994).
62. Information Disclosure Statements are the means by which the applicant submits
references to the PTO during the patent examination process. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97-99
(1996).
63. See Applied Materials, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1969.
64. See Northern Telecomm., Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
65. See Applied Materials, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1969.
66. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1996) (if the Office cites the reference the duty is
presumed to be discharged).
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up from time to time, and courts will occasionally entertain the
argument that one material reference was buried among a huge stack
of unimportant references submitted by an applicant to the PTO.67 In
holding the buried reference in question properly submitted to the
PTO, the Molins court reversed a district court determination that
burying the reference in a submission with over fifty other references
constituted inequitable conduct.68 The Molins court also took pains to
point out that proper practice before the PTO includes highlighting
which references are most material to patentability.69 The court also
noted that in this case the large number of references were cited
pursuant to a request for reexamination. 70 The Rohm & Haas case
presents an example where the Federal Circuit effectively concluded
that the reference was buried by the applicant, because the correct
affidavit was presented hours into an interview when the examiner
"just wanted them to leave." 71
The obvious problem with this flexibility lies in the everyday
judgment calls patent attorneys make. How does a patent attorney
know that a reference is material and not cumulative of prior art
already of record in the case? The Molins court indicated that the
Federal Circuit considers it important that references should be cited
in close cases.72 Brantley goes a step further by saying that one should
unquestionably cite a reference even if it is only slightly material.73
Likewise, the Molins decision indicates that applicants should
highlight the materiality of a reference.74 Understandably, however, a
patent attorney would not want to make an admission about any
reference. The resulting tension often leads to Information Disclosure
Statements with no commentary at all.
Some restrictions on effecting cure stand out from the precedents
in this area. First, reissue 75 is closed as an avenue for curing
67. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68. Id. at 1184.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See discussion of Rohm &Haas, supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
72. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
73. Brantley, supra note 7, at 249.
74. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1184.
75. Reissue of a patent can occur when a patent owner, through error and without
deceptive intent, claims either too much or too little. It is a public proceeding for issued
patents only, and is an ex parte proceeding for the patent owner before the PTO. If reissue
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inequitable conduct.76 The statute authorizing reissue requires that
any errors in the patent occurred without deceptive intent.77
Inequitable conduct, by definition, involves intent to deceive. 78 In In
re Clark, the patent had issued and been asserted in an infringement
action where it was held invalid for obviousness in light of a reference
known to the applicant's attorney but not disclosed to the PTO during
prosecution.79 The court did not, however, hold the patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct at that point.81 Clark applied
for reissue citing the reference in question and requesting that the
patent be examined for patentability over it.81 The PTO, citing the
prior judgment, refused to accept the reissue application due to
Clark's inability to meet the requirement of lack of deceptive intent.8 2
Ultimately, the case was appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, which held the application for reissue fatally defective due to
Clark's deceptive intent.8 3
In some close cases of inequitable conduct, reissue may be
available, but the court must conclude intent to deceive was not
present, which effectively means there was no inequitable conduct.'
Furthermore, the Clark court notes in a footnote that it has not passed
on whether an applicant could seek reissue if no holding of
unenforceability or invalidity had occurred. 5 Read together, the Clark
and Harita decisions seem to indicate reissue would be available, but a
patent owner would still have to litigate the intent issues when
asserting the patent.
is instituted within two years of issue of the patent, claims can be broadened, and claims
can always be narrowed. Reissue can involve any questions of patentability and any forms
of prior art, and can be abandoned, continued and divided as with any normal application.
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1996); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.171-1.179 (1996).
76. See In re Heany, 1911 C.D. 138 (Comm'r Pat. 1911). Cf In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623
(C.C.P.A. 1975).
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
78. See Clark, 522 F.2d at 627.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
85. Clark, 522 F.2d at 627 n.4.
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Most importantly, once a patent is judged unenforceable by a
court it cannot be cured. 86 Additionally, at least some authority stands
for the proposition that once a patent issues no cure can be effected in
it or its progeny,8 7 even if the inequitably attained patent is never
enforced.8 8 The Federal Circuit has never addressed how this
harmonizes with the Clark and Harita decisions. Unfortunately, the
prudent course of action for any patent holder would be to refrain
from asserting in court any patent with a possible inequitable conduct
issue, thereby effectively giving up the patent.
Several questions remain unresolved by current patent law and
court decisions. First, reexamination8 9 as a means to cure inequitable
conduct has never been addressed by any court, let alone the Federal
Circuit. Second, how inequitable conduct arises from problems with 35
U.S.C. § 102 remains unclear. Section 102 details what can be prior
art, and specifies what actions or publications can anticipate an
invention thereby barring patentability.9" Courts defer to PTO
determinations on technical issues because of the PTO's expertise in
these areas. When a patent attorney has facts that present a
conceivable example of a prior public use but which may be excused
as an experimental use, it is not obvious that those facts should be
disclosed to the PTO. On the one hand, the interest of having all the
facts examined by the PTO indicates disclosure. On the other hand,
the interests of judicial economy favor making the determination only
once in court, rather than both in court and in the PTO. Courts will
rely on and defer to PTO determinations regarding technical issues
when the PTO has all of the facts before it, but courts appear to be a
better forum for credibility determinations, and they understandably
86. See Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d 1556.
87. See supra note 25.
88. See Applied Materials Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d 1967 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
89. Reexamination of a patent involves submitting to the PTO prior art in the form of
patents and printed publications and requesting that the PTO reexamine a specific patent
in light of substantial new questions of patentability raised by the prior art. Once begun it
must proceed to a determination, either that the claims are patentable over the prior art,
that the claims as amended by the patent owner are patentable over the prior art, or that
no claims remain patentable over the prior art. Reexamination may be requested by
anyone, but after initial proceedings it is a purely ex parte proceeding for the patent owner
before the PTO. All reexamination proceedings are public. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-
307 (1996); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.501-1.570 (1996); MPEP § 2200 (1996).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
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disregard any PTO determinations made without all of the relevant
facts. If nothing else, the adversarial nature of a trial proceeding tends
to bring out more facts than the ex parte nature of patent prosecution.
IV
Problems with the Current Law
The problems with the current state of the law on inequitable
conduct leave one wondering how we got to this point in the first
place. Attorneys prosecuting patent applications are left to make
judgment calls on what information to provide and not provide to the
PTO. Once a patent infringement suit is filed, defendants have too
much leeway in pleading unenforceability due to the inequitable
conduct defense. Courts making determinations of inequitable
conduct must resolve confusing precedent from the Federal Circuit,
have no guidance on exactly how to determine inequitable conduct,
and are frequently reversed on appeal. Licenses including patents held
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct stand at best on shaky
ground. Most importantly though, the lack of a procedure for effecting
cure after a patent issues leaves patent owners with no way to repair
the damage.
Furthermore, attorneys must rely on their best judgment in
determining what constitutes a material reference.91 The dilemmas
attorneys face include determining whether to submit an apparently
cumulative piece of prior art or whether to disclose a possible
experimental use. What constitutes inequitable conduct is far from
clear at the time these judgments are made, and changes in the PTO
rules on disclosure are not interpreted by the courts until well after
the rules are made final.92 One attorney might view a piece of prior art
as clearly material where another attorney would view it as
immaterial. Likewise, one court might view a use as clearly
experimental and therefore not a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),93
whereas another court analyzing the same set of facts may invalidate
91. Some specific examples of these judgment calls are set forth in Patricia Brantley's
article on ethical issues facing patent attorneys. See Brantley, supra note 7, at 240-45.
92. See, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting
that the PTO had changed its definition of materiality and refusing to comment on it);
Brantley, supra note 7, at 240-45 (discussing Molins).
93. Section 102(b) bars patentability when the patented device or process has been
known or used by others or on sale more than one year before a patent application is filed
in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996).
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the patent for anticipation due to a public use that bars patentability.
The patent attorney prosecuting the application has the unenviable
task of deciding whether to alert the examiner to what the applicant
considers an experimental use.94
As mentioned above, many of these mundane factual
determinations will be replayed in the courts regardless of how the
examiner thinks they determine patentability. For example, ten years
after prosecuting a patent, a court proceeding may result in the
attorney being branded a fraud for failing to disclose the use of the
invention.95 The Federal Circuit has announced that in close cases,
applicants should err on the side of disclosure and let the PTO
determine patentability.96 However, what constitutes a close case is
not clear. 97 Eliminating that ambiguity as a concern for patent
attorneys would allow everyone involved in both prosecution and
litigation to act more efficiently.
The ease with which inequitable conduct may be pleaded as a
defense is also problematic. Patentholders can attempt to eliminate
inequitable conduct defenses at various stages of litigation.98 Recently,
courts have used the increased specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) 99
to strike inequitable conduct defenses when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions. 1°° However, once
a defendant has a specific reference available, the remaining questions
of materiality and intent represent factual determinations reviewable
only for clear error.10 1 Once the issue is raised, much of the resources
devoted to litigation go to this issue, thereby making infringement
actions that much more expensive for the patent owner. As an
example of how much litigation the inequitable conduct defense has
created, consider that Professor Chisum discusses inequitable conduct
for nearly two hundred pages of his chapter on defenses, and gives all
94. See Brantley, supra note 7, at 241.
95. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
96. See id.
97. See Brantley, supra note 7, at 241.
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
99. Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading fraud in a civil action. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b).
100. See, e.g., Sun-Flex Co. v. Softview Computer Prods. Corp., 750 F. Supp. 962 (N.D.
III. 1990).
101. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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of the remaining defenses enumerated by Congress or created by the
courts less than three hundred pages.102
The response that litigation should be expensive fails in these
situations. A similar response seems appropriate to the protections for
corporations provided by Rule 23.1.103 Rule 23.1 requires a high level
of specificity in prosecuting class action shareholder derivative suits
against corporations."° This rule was instituted in response to the
great expenditure of resources by litigants and the judiciary in dealing
with groundless suits used primarily as a means to extort a settlement
from a corporation. Given that the same concerns apply here, and that
a heightened standard of pleading already applies,105 the next step
seems to be to limit the options to those attempting to plead
inequitable conduct.
The district courts also have great latitude in how they determine
whether inequitable conduct occurred. In their efforts to interpret the
seemingly conflicting opinions of the Federal Circuit and do justice
when deciding patent cases, the federal district courts regularly
struggle with inequitable conduct and the Federal Circuit often feels
compelled to reverse their decisions.10 6 In deciding,. Kingsdown
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., the Federal Circuit even
took it upon itself to include a unanimous en banc section in the
opinion devoted to inequitable conduct titled "Resolution of
Conflicting Precedent. ' 10 7 For a long time, determinations of whether
a reference is material or whether a patentee intended to deceive the
PTO were reviewed for clear error, but whether inequitable conduct
occurred was reviewed de novo.108 This odd dichotomy resulted from
the underlying elements of materiality and intent falling into the
classification of findings of fact while inequitable conduct constituted
a conclusion of law.109 As a result, the determinations of a district
102. CHISUM, supra note 30, § 19.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Sun-Flex, 750 F. Supp. at 962.
106. See Goldman, supra note 7, at 85-87. See also Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co.,
115 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (remanding for a new trial because alleged infringer
prejudiced jury with evidence about inequitable conduct even though District Court
granted summary judgment to plaintiff on inequitable conduct before trial).
107. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
108. See id.
109. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed.
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court could be and often were overruled by the Federal Circuit with
impunity. The Federal Circuit changed the standard of review from de
novo to abuse of discretion, 110 but the general trend in this area is that
the Federal Circuit will still overrule the trial courts with great
regularity."'
It is far from clear what procedure should be used for deciding
inequitable conduct issues in the district courts. Some courts have
used jury determinations, while other courts have reserved the
inequitable conduct issue for a bench trial." 2 The Federal Circuit has
cited with approval the various methods district courts use.113
However, the Federal Circuit has also remanded cases to the district
courts for failure to properly proceed in trying issues of inequitable
conduct." 4
Another problem arises in scenarios involving licenses. As
discussed above, a license for an invalid patent is itself invalid." 5
However, most licenses involve multiple patents and/or other
intellectual property." 6 As a result, invalidation of patents leaves
these contracts on less than firm ground due to the Lear line of
cases. 117 Forcing companies to renegotiate licensing contracts each
time a patent proves unenforceable requires that companies value
each patent individually. This would greatly reduce economic
efficiency and the administrability of licensing contracts.
Lastly, the biggest problem in this area involves the unavailability
of cure after the patent issues. Given a situation where a reference is
discovered to be more material than it appeared during prosecution,
the appearance of misconduct may sink the patent even though the
Cir. 1984).
110. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
111. See, e.g., Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (reversing district court determination of inequitable conduct). See also Gambro
Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1580-82 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing
district court determination of inequitable conduct).
112. See, e.g., Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
113. See id.
114. See supra note 106.
115. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1467, 1473-74 (D. Or.
1991) (license provision of under 300 words granting cross-license between Hewlett-
Packard and Intel on all patents filed before Jan. 1, 2001).
117. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) and discussion supra notes 39-46 and
accompanying text.
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patentee had no actual intent to deceive."' A similar set of
circumstances could occur when a prior use turns out to be
commercial instead of experimental, or a lost lab notebook turns up
with data detrimental to patentability. 1i 9 While one could argue that
the patentee should have been more careful during the initial
prosecution, this places an unworkable burden on anyone attempting
to obtain a patent, and could lead to both less use of the patent system
and less disclosure of ideas to the public. All of these problems cry out
for an opportunity for post-issue cure, such as reexamination or
reissue. Currently, however, a court would have good reason to rule
these types of cure both unavailable and ineffective for inequitable
conduct reasons.120
V
Solutions
Solving the problems with the current law on inequitable conduct
would require changes in the law. The penalty for inequitable conduct
is unenforceability of the patent, but some form of post-issuance cure
that focuses on materiality and patentability must be made available.
Once allegations of inequitable conduct are raised in a court
proceeding, the range of possible outcomes should be structured such
that one of the two parties pays a penalty, either for asserting an
unenforceable patent, or for raising an unproven defense of
unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. While these solutions
have some disadvantages, they do improve patent litigation and they
work better than other available solutions. Regardless, the PTO
should not inquire into issues of intent in the future.
First, the penalty for inequitable conduct should be that the
patent is unenforceable until cure is effected. This does not represent
a change in the patent itself,121 but adding post-issue cure requires
changes in the law. Additionally, the Rohm & Haas steps seem well
adapted to the process of effecting a cure and should be retained.
118. See, e.g., Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed Cir. 1995) (those who
are not up-front with the PTO run the risk of having their patents invalidated).
119. This hypothetical assumes that the prior uses would not result in per se
unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) but would be material enough to satisfy the court
that inequitable conduct occurred.
120. See Casey, supra note 24 (once a patent issues from the PTO, cure cannot be
effected).
121. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d at 1572; In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623 at n.4.
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Currently, no post-issue cure opportunities exist,122 except for the
narrow Harita exception.123 Both reissue and reexamination should be
available for cure of inequitable conduct.
Given the compelling public interest in the validity of issued
patents, 124 post-issue cure, while it must be available, must also be
discouraged. Therefore, post-issue cure must be expensive,
considerably more so than reexamination. Additionally, the
presumption of validity must be eliminated, though this requires no
change in current PTO practice, as the Federal Circuit has held that
no patent before the PTO enjoys the presumption of validity.125 The
patentee must still prove patentability over the art or evidence in
question as required by the Rohm & Haas standard.
Currently, the PTO receives an issue fee of $1,250 and
maintenance fees of several thousand dollars on all issued patents.126
However, since an abandoned patent brings in no revenue to the PTO,
the PTO has a strong incentive to allow, rather than deny,
patentability. Under the current scheme, upon receiving a request for
reexamination the PTO has a strong tendency to determine that a
substantial new question of patentability does exist and therefore
grant the request. The reexamination process involves revenue for the
PTO127 and the PTO also generally leaves some claims intact after any
reexamination, thereby keeping its maintenance fee revenue stream
intact. 128
122. See Golden Valley Microwave Foods v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp. 1444
(N.D. Ind. 1992), affd, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
123. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. In Harita, an application for reissue
of a patent was rejected by the PTO due to inequitable conduct in the original prosecution.
Harita, 847 F.2d at 802-03. The court reversed the rejection, finding that the applicants and
their agents did not have the requisite intent for a finding of inequitable conduct. Id. at
808-09.
124. See Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d at 1572.
125. See Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
126. See Annual Report of the Patent and Trademark Office, Financial Review, Trends
in Revenues and Expenses (visited Jan. 28, 1998) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/
annual/1996/finrev.html> (PTO relies heavily on maintenance fees to cover processing
costs associated with patent applications). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.19 (1996) (current level of
maintenance fees). See generally 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17-1.20 (1996) for a list of fees charged by
the PTO for various services.
127. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c) (1996) (fee for filing a request for Reexamination is
$2,520).
128. See Glenn E. Von Tersch et al., Strengthening and Weakening the Patent Through
Reexamination and Reissue, 456 PLI/Pat 417, 434 (1996) for statistics on reexamination.
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The fee charged for PTO determinations of inequitable conduct
issues should be triggered by the patent owner's admission that a
misrepresentation occurred, and must be charged before the
determination is made. This would help eliminate the PTO's current
bias toward issuing applications, rather than finally rejecting them, by
making the revenue available from the inequitable conduct
determination independent of the result. Also, making post-issue cure
expensive would give patent owners additional incentive to fix
inequitable conduct issues before the patent issues, thereby furthering
the goals of honesty and disclosure during patent prosecution.129 The
expense of litigating an inequitable conduct claim would dwarf even a
$10,000 fee, so the patent owner would have financial incentives here,
too.
Once post-issue cure is sought, the PTO must determine whether
the invention is patentable over the actual facts in the case of a
misrepresentation or a withheld reference; and the issue of intent
should be left by the wayside. Licensees of the patent should have a
cause of action for recovery of license fees paid prior to cure, thereby
also promoting proper conduct before the PTO. The patent should be
enforceable after cure is effected.
When a patent infringement suit occurs, penalties on both sides of
the inequitable conduct issue should be severe. Rule 11 can serve as a
model here, but courts need to strenuously enforce it. 130 When a
patent owner attempts to enforce an unenforceable patent, the patent
owner should be subject to both Rule 11-type sanctions and paying
costs for his opponent, regardless of whether the patent owner knew
that the patent was invalid.131 This would provide more incentive to
clear up inequitable conduct problems prior to litigation.
On the flip side, charging inequitable conduct needs to be riskier
to the alleged infringer. Using Rule 11 sanctions as a model, an
alleged infringer could be made strictly liable for sanctions and costs
to the patent owner for defending an unsuccessful inequitable conduct
129. See Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d at 1571 ("[A] very important policy consideration is
to discourage all manner of dishonest conduct in dealing with the PTO.").
130. Courts seem reluctant to award sanctions in general. See, e.g., Jack Frost Labs.,
Inc. v. Physicians & Nurses Mfg. Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding
legal fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 but no other sanctions for egregious conduct in asserting a
clearly unenforceable patent).
131. Knowingly asserting an invalid patent is already sanctionable. See, e.g., Argus
Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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charge, even though the alleged infringer had a reference that might
be material enough to justify an inequitable conduct charge. Both
sides would then be strictly liable on the issue of inequitable conduct,
rather than having to satisfy the scienter requirement of Rule 11.132
On both sides of the issue, awards of fees and sanctions must be up to
the discretion of the judge, but guidelines should narrow that
discretion considerably, mandating awards in all but the closest of
cases.
If both parties agree, then a court could stay a suit for
infringement while the parties seek reexamination by the PTO. 133 This
would provide for a cheaper determination on inequitable conduct.
Unfortunately, at present, reexamination typically favors the patent
owner, so getting both' parties to agree might prove difficult.134
There are several natural counterarguments to this type of
change. First, anyone defending a patent infringement suit would want
the flexibility to investigate whether inequitable conduct did occur.
Additionally, the interest in having the PTO function efficiently
cannot be ignored; this requires disclosure of prior art early in the
application process. 135 Likewise, the strong interest in the validity of
issued patents can be cited against these proposed reforms. 136
Obviously, the threat of an inequitable conduct charge tends to give
the patent applicants much more incentive to cite prior art to the
PTO.
The answers to these counter-arguments are readily apparent.
While a party would be subject to sanctions for erroneously pleading
inequitable conduct in a suit, that party would not be precluded from
investigating the possibility even if it is not pleaded. The same
references that form the basis of an inequitable conduct charge can be
useful to invalidate the patent without investigating the state of mind
of those prosecuting the application.' 37 Therefore, those references
132. Rule 11 allows for sanctions when attorneys knowingly file papers or otherwise
make misrepresentations to the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 11
133. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 951, 952-53
(W.D.N.Y. 1996).
134. See Von Tersch et al., supra note 128, at 439-42 (reexamination is generally a good
option for patent owners, but not for alleged infringers).
135. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1996) (full disclosure by applicants helps the PTO
properly assess patentability of claims).
136. See Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d at 1571.
137. Kingsdown requires a material reference, which implies the reference qualifies as
prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 867.
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would be part of the litigation regardless of whether inequitable
conduct is charged. Leave to amend a complaint or answer to include
inequitable conduct issues would likely be forthcoming if discovery
turned up a clear case of inequitable conduct.
At least one court advanced another possible solution to the
inequitable conduct problem well before it had reached "plague"
status. The Third Circuit, before the Federal Circuit existed, 38 held
only those claims that were affected by inequitable conduct invalid.'39
However, that case has been cited with disapproval by the Federal
Circuit.140 Ultimately, the Third Circuit's solution suffers from two
problems. First, it gives the patentee little incentive to avoid
committing inequitable conduct. Second, it makes litigation of patents
that much less predictable by allowing a series of defendants to slowly
chip away at a patent, possibly even leading to inconsistent
adjudication on a given patent when one court holds no intent to
deceive and a second court finds intent to deceive on the same facts.14 1
A possible solution that has yet to appear in the literature is to
strike from the patent the broadest claim when inequitable conduct is
found. This does penalize the patent owner for inequitable conduct,
but to a more reasonable degree. Unfortunately, this novel approach
fails to solve most of the problems in this area. In particular, it
provides no incentive to the patentee to avoid inequitable conduct
because the patentee can simply include several broad claims in
anticipation of inequitable conduct. This idea also would prove tough
to implement, as claims can be broad in some ways, narrow in others,
such that two claims can simultaneously be broader than each other,
depending on the perspective from which the patent is viewed. For
instance, patents often include numerous claims with slightly different
wording that results in slightly different limitations on the scope of
those claims. Deciding which of several similar claims was broadest
would be a judgment call that could only serve to waste judicial
resources.
138. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and given jurisdiction over all patent
appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
139. See In re Frost, 540 F.2d 601,611 (3d Cir. 1976).
140. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 n.8
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (In re Frost is not precedent in the Federal Circuit).
141. Generally, a patent infringement suit will only involve one alleged infringer, as
each infringing act constitutes a separate transaction or occurrence, thereby precluding
joinder.
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Another possible reform would be some form of inter partes or
third party challenges within the PTO on inequitable conduct issues.
To some degree, Congress has discussed this concept perennially in
conjunction with efforts to reform reexamination of patents and the
patent system in general, but it has not focused on inequitable
conduct.142 This type of reform could concentrate these cases in a
forum with expertise in the area of law, and might save money the way
binding arbitration can. The problem here is that the PTO provides a
poor forum for determinations of intent, and for credibility
determinations in general.143 And again, given how reexamination
tends to work, the PTO will likely favor the patent owner over an
alleged infringer.1"
As it stands, interviews are conducted between an examiner and
an applicant and/or his attorney.145 This format allows for a full and
fair discussion of the prior art in question, and an opportunity to clear
up what can be substantial misunderstandings resulting from
exchanges that occur only on paper. A fair number of interviews are
conducted over the phone. The PTO requires that the applicant
summarize the substance of any interview with an examiner and make
it of record in the patent application, unless the examiner informs the
applicant that the examiner will record the interview.146
What all of these interviews lack is the adversarial nature that is
inherent in. inter partes proceedings. Even the physical facilities at the
PTO currently lack the capacity for frequent inter partes hearings.
The only procedures currently conducted by the PTO that require
inter partes hearings are interferences, 47 and interferences occur so
rarely that their existence does not provide much support for more
inter partes proceedings. Additionally, having an examiner, typically
with no legal training, deal with an inter partes proceeding presents
142. See Von Tersch et al., supra note 128, at 444-45 (proposed Omnibus Patent and
Trademark Office Reform bill HR 3460 includes making reexamination an inter partes
proceeding).
143. See MPEP § 2010 (1996).
144. See Von Tersch et al., supra note 128, at 439-42 (reexamination is generally a good
option for patent owners, but not for alleged infringers).
145. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133 (1996).
146. See id.
147. An interference results when two applications before the PTO attempt to claim
the same invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1996).
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many possible pitfalls. Thus, PTO determinations on intent and
credibility issues in general should remain a thing of the past.
VI
Conclusion
Under the current law, the defense of unenforceability of a patent
due to inequitable conduct is poorly administered in the courts and
prejudices the rights of patent owners. To remedy this situation, two
changes should occur. One, post-issue cure should be made available
through reexamination or reissue of patents. This cure should allow a
patent owner to pay a large fee to have patentability determined over
prior art or material information that the patent owner admits was
withheld from the PTO. At that point, whatever patent results should
be enforceable from that date forward as if no inequitable conduct
had occurred. Two, the stakes for inequitable conduct in the courts
should be raised. Whether a patent owner asserts an unenforceable
patent or an alleged infringer asserts a defense of unenforceability due
to inequitable conduct, the party losing on the issue should pay
attorneys' fees and sanctions unless the judge can find strong reasons
for waiving these penalties. This would eliminate all but the most
worthy defenses and provide strong incentive to patent owners to
make sure their patents are valid.
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